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A REPLY TO PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN
William A. Woodruff
Professor Koppelman's response to my article warrants a brief reply. I respect
his opinions on this issue, but he and I approach it from different perspectives.
Indeed, different perspectives help to sharpen the issues and to reveal both areas of
agreement and areas of disagreement. While I see no point in refuting each criticism
he raises, and I am sure that he did not address every single point on which we
disagree, there are, however, several points in Professor Koppelman's essay that
warrant comment.
Professor Koppelman states that my "central claim is that the civilian branches
of government ought to defer to the military about military matters."' Professor
Koppelman has misunderstood my point. I apparently did not make myself clear.
I apologize for this misunderstanding and appreciate the opportunity to clarify the
issue. As I understand our system of government, we have three branches of
government: (1) the executive; (2) the legislative; and (3) the judicial. All three are
"civilian." The military, as an agency, is part of the executive branch and the
Constitution names the President as Commander-in-Chief. 2 The Constitution gives
Congress plenary authority to make the rules and regulations governing the land and
naval forces. 3 Thus, the Constitution places responsibility and control over military
affairs in two "civilian" branches of government, the executive and legislative. This
principle of civilian control of the military is integral to our system of government,
part of our national heritage, and I wholeheartedly support it. Neither the Congress
nor the Executive has any constitutional obligation to "defer to the military" on
anything. In fact, my "central claim" is that Congress, the "civilian branch" of
government with the constitutional responsibility and authority to make the rules
and regulations in this area, should take action to eliminate the confusion and
contradictions that were created by the Department of Defense directives. Thus, I
am arguing that Congress should not defer to the military, but should actually
require DoD to change its implementing directives.
The deference issue, however, does arise when the judicial branch is called
upon to review military policy. As I noted,4 the Supreme Court has established a
long and virtually unbroken line of cases cautioning judicial restraint when
reviewing military affairs; affairs that the very text of the Constitution vests in
coordinate branches of government. I do not advocate "blind deference" nor giving
"infinite weight" to military judgment; I am of the opinion that the application of
well-settled principles established by the Supreme Court in a long line of cases sets
the correct balance. Professor Koppelman states that my "extreme claim" and "silly
argument" of "blind deference" must be applied for the policy to withstand analysis.
What Professor Koppelman is really saying is that I am relying upon the clear
weight of judicial authority in this area; he just thinks the law should be different.
1. Andrew Koppeiman, Gaze in the Military: A Response to Professor Woodruff, 64 UMKC
L. REv. 179 (1995).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8.
4. See William A. Woodruff, Homosexualityand MilitaryService: Legislation, Implementation,
and Litigation, 64 UMKC L. REV. 121, nn.75-76 and accompanying text (1995).
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Let's face it, it would be "extreme," "silly," "blind" and any number of other
pejorative adjectives, including "incompetent," for a lawyer NOT to rely upon the
weight of authority when it is in his favor!
While neither the executive nor the legislative branches has any constitutional
duty to defer to the military, I do believe that military policy decisions should be
made in light of the mission and purpose of the military. In this regard, the views,
experience, advice, and opinions of military leaders are critical to determining the
impact a proposed policy will have upon the military's ability to accomplish its
mission and purp6se. Congress and the Executive are constitutionally free to
disregard such advice. Professor Koppelman and I disagree on the weight the policy
maker should place on the opinions of experienced military leaders in these matters.
In the matter at issue here, I think the detailed hearings and investigations conducted
by both houses of congress explored and properly weighed the relevant facts,
arguments, advice, opinions, and judgments. I, like the Congress, would err on the
side of national defense and military readiness. Professor Koppelman would err on
the side of individual rights. This, in and of itself, is a policy choice; we approach
the issue from different perspectives.
Professor Koppelman notes that in two situations professional military
judgment has been proven wrong and is thus suspect in all future cases. He thus
criticizes my analysis for not discussing Korematsu v. United States5 and the history
of racial segregation that existed in the armed forces prior to President Truman's
1948 executive order. In general, the fact that military and political leaders, and
even a majority of the Supreme Court, erred in deciding some previous policy or
case does not warrant abandoning well-established principles that, over the run of
cases, have recognized and maintained the constitutional allocation of powers
among the three branches of government. Furthermore, Professor Koppelman's
reliance on the Korematsu tragedy and the history of racial segregation overlooks
key factors that make them inapposite to the homosexual exclusion policy.
First, both race and national origin are suspect classes and demand strict
scrutiny. While Professor Koppelman, other commentators, and some individual
judges have called for granting suspect class status to homosexuals, the courts
simply have not done so. The standard of judicial review applicable to the
homosexual policy is rational basis review. That is the law that applies and that is
the standard under which I analyzed the statute passed by Congress. I applied the
law as it currently exists, not the law as Professor Koppelman thinks it ought to be.
Second, even assuming a parallel between the racial segregation issue and the
homosexual issue, I must note that it was the Executive, not the courts, that changed
the policy. Thus, one of the political branches with constitutional authority over the
military made the decision, not the judiciary.
Finally, invoking the language of the racial segregation debates assumes that
racial groups and homosexuals share the same "status." Equating a class defined by
skin color with a class defined by sexual behavior overlooks obvious, significant,
and material differences. These differences, in large measure, explain why the
courts have consistently rejected the analogy and have refused to apply strict
scrutiny.6
5. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
6. I apparently disappointed Professor Koppelman by not including a detailed discussion of
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Professor Koppelman also criticizes me for relying upon the findings of
Congress that are included in the statute. I plead guilty. Under the settled principles
of law applicable to these sorts of cases, reviewing courts should rely upon the
detailed legislative findings.7 If a different standard of review applied, a different
analysis would be required, and perhaps a different outcome would result. In view
of the unanimous line of authority rejecting suspect class status for homosexuals and
rejecting the application of strict scrutiny, however, I did not feel it necessary to
analyze the statute under that heightened scrutiny standard. Professor Koppelman's
argument is not with me, it is with the Supreme Court decisions that provide the
framework for rational basis review and with the constitutional allocation of powers
among the three branches of government.
In footnote one of his response, Professor Koppelman notes that General
Schwartzkopf "privately stated that he won't mind the policy's termination" and
cites Randy Shilts' book, Conduct Unbecoming. In fairness to General
Schwartzkopf, I must point out that when asked in a hearing before the Senate
Armed Services Committee about this alleged comment, General Schwartzkopf
characterized Mr. Shilts' account as "a blatant lie." 8
Professor Koppelman dismisses as "unworthy of response" my "transparently
disingenuous claim"9 that "all agree" homosexual conduct in the military
environment causes "[h]arm to [g]ood [o]rder, [d]iscipline, [m]orale, and [u]nit
[c]ohesion."' Yet this is precisely the procedural posture of the most celebrated
cases challenging the military's policy. Gay rights advocates representing soldiers
challenging their discharges for homosexuality have conceded that the military can
lawfully discharge those who engage in homosexual conduct. Thus, even the panel
decision in the D.C. Circuit that overturned Midshipman Steffan's discharge from
the Naval Academy recognized that 'homosexual acts' are forbidden to military
servicemembers, and there is no dispute that laws forbidding such conduct are
constitutional."" Congress certainly was 'of that view when it found "[t]he
prohibition against homosexual conduct is a long-standing element of military law
that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of military service."2
My use of the phrase "all agree" in reference to this proposition was to express this
underlying principle that has never seriously been disputed in the litigation
surrounding the policy. 3 Obviously, Professor Koppelman believes this principle
should be disputed. I did not intend to be speaking for Professor Koppelman by
using that phrase and extend to him my apologies.

why the courts have unanimously refused to grant suspect class status to homosexuals. Koppelman,
supra note 1, at 180. In view of the unanimous line of authority on this point, however, it hardly
seemed necessary. For a discussion of these cases and their rationale, see MELISSA WELLS-PETRY,
EXCLUSION: HOMOSEXUALS AND THE RIGHT TO SERVE 37-49 (1993).
7. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981).
8. Policy ConcerningHomosexuality in the Armed Forces:HearingsBefore the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 625 (1993).
9. Koppelman, supra note 1, at 189 n.52.
10. Id.
11. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
12. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(13) (West Supp. 1994).
13. See Woodruff, supra note 4, at 156-57 nn.193-200 and accompanying text.
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Interestingly, there seem to be some areas where Professor Koppelman and
I agree. He does not challenge the absurdity of the status-conduct dichotomy that
the current DoD directives create. He apparently agrees that homosexuality is
related to same sex behavior. 4 He does not take issue with the underlying
assumption that homosexuals, as a class, engage in same sex behavior. Further, he
acknowledges that the policy is constitutional when analyzed under rational basis
review, even though he does not think it wise, thinks the judicial reasoning rejecting
suspect class status for homosexuals was "remarkably tortured," and thinks the
courts should change the level of review and apply strict scrutiny. 5
My purpose in writing was to demonstrate that the 1981 policy and the new
statute are indeed constitutional under the existing standards of rational basis review
and, because they pass rational basis review, the political branches, not the courts,
have the final say on this matter. Professor Koppelman does not really contest either
point. Perhaps my arguments were not incomprehensible after all.

14. Koppelman, supra note 1, at 188-93.
15. Id. at 187.

HeinOnline -- 64 UMKC L. Rev. 198 1995-1996

